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EAST-WEST TRADE-NEW APPROACHES
The present stage in East-West economic cooperation has
reached the point at which four socialist countries have become
members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and were thus admitted to the world trade system on the basis of
non-discrimination and the most-favored-nation clause. Of those,
Poland, Romania and Hungary are also members of the Council for
Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA, Comecon) while Yugoslavia-not a
formal member-is extensively engaged in the socialist system of
economic cooperation.
Trade between socialist and free economy countries has a long
history, and foreign trade experts are quite familiar with socialist
foreign trade techniques.1 Free world exporters and importers in a
number of countries represent today an impressive business milieu
professionally engaged in East-West economic cooperation. It is
also true however that East-West trade operations are, compared
with world trade volume, relatively insignificant. Even today, the
foreign trade policy of the socialist countries seems to be directed at
preventing their full integration into the world economic system.
The main reason seems to be that the function of foreign trade is
primarily to obtain financing for transforming the national econo-
mies of these countries into industrial societies, according to
programs fixed in their long term economic plans.2
While this remains true today, it is also true that joining GATT
was connected with an important change of mind as regards the
function of foreign trade in socialist economies. The Communique
on the 25th session of the CMEA (6 July 1971) stated that:
The session declared that any country that is not a
Comecon member can fully or partially participate in the
implementation of the measures envisaged by the compre-
hensive program. The CMEA member countries will con-
tinue to develop economic, scientific and technical ties with
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2. Grzybowski, The Socialist Commonwealth of Nations 85 (1964) and id., "For-
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the developing countries and the developed capitalist states
on the principles of peaceful coexistence, equality, mutual
advantage and respect for sovereignty.3
While similar sentiments were expressed before, at this mo-
ment this modest statement seems to have acquired new meaning.
It seems to be a result of a conviction that further progress, sophisti-
cation, and industrial expansion call for closer economic cooperation
with the outside world.
By the time the comprehensive program was being considered,
the need for at least partial reintegration of Comecon into the world
economic system became quite clear. The main pattern for this new
approach was generally accepted. The West was to supply the ma-
chinery, factory equipment, technology and know-how, and general
cooperation in the expansion and modernization of the industrial es-
tablishment in the East. The East in exchange was to supply cheap
labor and raw materials and to export at least some of the goods and
commodities produced in the East.4
A Soviet economist writing in early 1973 argued for an extensive
program of reintegration:
Obviously, the guaranteeing of security in Europe
would make it possible to free substantial material and la-
bor resources and would create conditions for carrying out a
number of major all-European projects. At present, the cre-
ation of a common power system for Europe by linking the
existing power systems of the C.M.E.A. member-countries
and the countries of Western Europe, as well as a single
system of internal waterways, is technically possible, and
the construction of major transcontinental petroleum and
gas pipelines and cooperation in the field of environmental
protection are feasible. The joint conduct of nuclear and
space research, the joint use of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, the pooling of states' efforts in combating such
diseases as cancer, cardiovascular diseases, etc., are also
possible. ...
The C.M.E.A. countries' trade with the industrially de-
veloped capitalist countries, which because of the Western
powers' policy of prohibitions had been on a low level, at
present is one of the most dynamic areas of world trade. In
1960-1970 the average annual growth rates of the socialist
countries' exports and imports to the developed capitalist
3. Pravda, 30 June 1971. Cf. Chukanov, "Programma sotsialisticheskoi eko-
nomicheskoi integratsii pretvorajetsia v zhizn," 1972 Kommunist no. 13, 27-38.
4. Compare for example Shershnev, 1972 Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologia no. 4, 3-
14; Alkimov, Arbatov, Inozemtsev, Izvestia, 8 May 1973, Spandaryan, Pravda, 20 Oct.
1971, Shershnev, Pravda, 13 June 1973.
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countries were 10.9% and 9.9% respectively, while the
growth rate of world trade as a whole was 9.4%. Moreover,
in the second half of the 1960s these rates were higher than
in the first half. In 1971 the European C.M.E.A. countries'
trade turnover with the capitalist states came to
$17,500,000,000.
The overwhelming bulk of the C.M.E.A. countries' trade
with the capitalist countries is with Western Europe, but
their trade turnover with Japan is growing rapidly. In 1970
exports to Japan had increased by 650% in comparison with
1960 and were almost three times larger than exports to the
U.S.A. Japan holds first place (734,000,000 rubles in 1971) in
the U.S.S.R.'s trade with the developed capitalist countries. 5
The argument in favor of extended economic cooperation be-
tween the Soviet Union and the West was given full treatment in a
subsequent article in Pravda that listed three reasons for closer co-
operation between the socialist and capitalist systems. In the first
place, specialization is the motor of progress, as no country in the
world, even the largest, is able to develop all aspects of production.
The Soviet Union has large reserves of oil and raw materials, which
must not remain idle, and needs investment, equipment and know-
how, which are available in the industrial West, provided of course
that credits to the USSR can be paid with a part of the goods or
materials produced in new enterprises. Finally, cooperation with
the capitalist world will assure the flow of foreign currency that will
permit raising the standard of living of the Soviet people. In effect,
this article argued in favor of the worldwide division of labor, of a
world market, and of identity of economic interest in all countries
regardless of their social systems. At the same time, the new direc-
tion for the program of development and integration of the Comecon
area was not adopted without serious soul-searching, particularly
since it would require an end to a policy of economic autarchy
within Comecon.
A few years later, a study prepared at the Institute of the World
Socialist System of the USSR Academy of Science provided a theo-
retical explanation of the policy of the economic rapprochement to
the Western industrial world:
Policy considerations may temporarily deform world ec-
onomic links, disturb their development, change their direc-
tion, however, . . . as history shows, objective economic
necessity invariably breaks through most complicated barri-
ers of political obstacles.
5. Voinov, "Ekonomicheskie otnoshenia sotsialisticheskikh stran z razvitimi
kapitalisticheskimi gosudarstvami," 1973 Planovoe Gosudarstvo no. 3, 110-120.
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In the contemporary world the progress of each country
is inseparable from its participation in the world exchange
of material and spiritual values reflecting interdependence
of all countries. A mass of visible and invisible threads link
the economic development of separate countries with those
changes which take place in the world economy. 6
REFORM OF THE FOREIGN TRADE MECHANISM
In order to implement this new policy, an adjustment in trading
techniques of Eastern European socialist countries was necessary.
The reform could be generally described as change-of-trade tech-
niques in free economy countries, although State foreign trade mo-
nopoly was still maintained. Its main features were to involve the
producers directly in foreign sales, to make them more competitive
and independent of government foreign trade agencies. The extent
of change may be best seen when the reformed foreign trade mecha-
nisms in the European members of CMEA are compared with that
of the Soviet Union, which with minor changes retained the shape
established in the interwar years.
In the Soviet Union, foreign transactions were initially the re-
sponsibility of foreign trade delegations, a peculiarly Soviet organi-
zation, either attached to or a part of the diplomatic mission
accredited to foreign governments abroad. Foreign trade delega-
tions had no personality except that of the State which they repre-
sented, and their transactions engaged its financial responsibility.
They were given a status in which two elements were combined. Al-
though a part of the diplomatic mission, and therefore enjoying sov-
ereign immunity as a trading agency, foreign trade delegations were
subject to local jurisdiction and were responsible for discharging the
obligations of the Soviet State with assets under their control. 7
As an instrument of foreign trade, trade delegations were found
to be inadequate. In due course, the Soviet Union began to experi-
ment with new forms of trading organizations which, after some de-
velopment, have assumed the name of foreign trade associations.
These associations are governmental agencies with the status of le-
gal entities subordinate to the Ministry (Commissariat) of Foreign
Trade, which issues charters determining their roles in the foreign
trade field. Each foreign trade association is responsible for a spe-
cific line of products imported or exported abroad. Its directors and
higher personnel are appointed by the Minister of Foreign Trade.
Yugoslavia initiated experimentation with different arrange-
6. Shmelev ed., Ekonomicheskie sviazi Vostok-Zapad, Institut Ekonomiki
Mirovoi Sotsialisticheskoi Sistemy 12-13, 14 (1976).
7. Grzybowski, Soviet Private International Law 72 (1965).
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ments. In the 1960s other Comecon countries followed suit, seeking
credits, investment capital and a greater share of free-economy mar-
kets, particularly in manufactured products, machinery, factory
equipment and complete industrial plants. The realities of trade, in-
ternal problems affecting industrial processes, the drive towards
raising the quality and quantity of commodity production and the
attractiveness and competitiveness of the goods exported mitigated
against total separation of production from trade organizations. As a
result, nearly all of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe were
forced to modify their foreign trade organizations to de-emphasize
the separation of trading agencies from production and to stress di-
rect involvement of the producer in selling his product abroad or
buying the kinds of goods (prefabricated goods, machinery, raw
materials and equipment) required by his factory or enterprise. Al-
though a wide variety of standardized staples may be disposed of
routinely in foreign markets, other forms of foreign trade, such as
sales of plants and machinery, fashions and clothing, automotive
equipment, electronics, necessitate direct contact between the pro-
ducer and the sales market.
Currently, the socialist world appears to be split into two
groups. China, North Korea, Mongolia, North Vietnam, Cuba, Alba-
nia and the Soviet Union itself have retained the original Soviet
model of foreign trade organization. Yugoslavia has not only re-
jected the Soviet model but also restructured the state monopoly of
foreign trade. Other Eastern socialist countries have combined the
Soviet system of foreign trade monopoly with a new approach to
handling foreign trade transactions. Bulgaria holds a special place
in that group. While retaining government monopoly over foreign
trade, the Bulgarians have abolished specialized agencies and re-
placed them with producers' unions and combinations of govern-
mental and cooperative organizations responsible both for foreign
trade operations and for serving the domestic market. However the
number of these unions is quite limited.8
Yugoslavia regards foreign trade operations as the responsibil-
ity of the association of producers under Art. 4 of the Law of 4 April
1965. 9 An association of producers is a separate legal entity
financially accountable for all its obligations. Foreign trade in Yugo-
slavia is regulated by the Law of 2 July 1962, amended in 1965 and
1966.10 Imports and exports are free and may be restricted only by
federal legislation. At present, two such restrictions are in force.
First, socialist enterprises alone have the right to engage in foreign
8. Jakubowski, Przedsiebiorstwa w Handlu Miedzynarodowym 34-35 (1972).
9. Law No. 34, Sluzbeni list Demokratske Federativne Jugoslavje (Yugoslav Offi-
cial Gazette) (1965) [hereafter, Sluzbeni list].
10. Law No. 245, Sluzbeni list (1966).
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trade activities. Privately owned industries and enterprises may not
trade abroad. Second, enterprises embarking upon foreign trade op-
erations must be of appropriate size, permitting the employment of
trained personnel to manage foreign trade transactions. In order to
facilitate the creation of such organizations (Yugoslavia is not a
country of large companies and corporations), the Law of 12 July
196711 provides that smaller enterprises may combine to establish
trading consortiums and concerns which include economic organiza-
tions of other countries. Organizations authorized to participate in
foreign trade operations may establish agencies, branches or part-
nerships with foreign firms abroad as well. The only requirement is
registration with the Yugoslavian Ministry of Foreign Trade. 12
In other socialist countries, the government monopoly, directed
exclusively by governmental agencies, remains the primary trading
organization. In Poland for example, foreign trade transactions are
the responsibility of agencies organized as government enterprises
(similar to the Soviet model), cooperative organizations and joint
stock companies. In the past the bulk of foreign commercial trans-
actions was handled by government enterprises of the Soviet type;
now the emphasis appears to have shifted to direct involvement of
producers in foreign trade operations. Recent Polish legislation
tends to encourage the formation of new joint stock companies and
cooperative organizations in order to organize producers to engage
in foreign trade transactions. 13
The legal status of foreign trade enterprises in Poland is deter-
mined by the 1950, decree on government enterprises 14 and the 1964
Civil Code. These enterprises are chartered, organized and staffed
by the Ministry of Foreign Trade or by other competent ministries.
Their foreign trade operations must conform to the foreign trade
regulations, identical for all types of foreign trade organizations as
regards the legal capacity to make contracts, licensing of imports
and exports and registration with the Polish Chamber of Foreign
Trade. Cooperative organizations and their unions are governed by
the Law of 17 February 1961,15 while joint stock companies are regu-
lated by the provisions of the old Commercial Code. These basic
provisions afford significant opportunities to adapt the actual organi-
zation of foreign trade mechanisms to policy requirements. On 7
December 1966, the Council of Ministers decided to encourage direct
11. Law No. 243, Sluzbeni list (1967).
12. Jakubowski, supra n. 8 at 54-55, 86.
13. Resolution of the Council of Ministers of 7 Dec. 1966, Monitor Polski, no. 69
(1966).
14. Dziennik Ustaw (Polish Official Law Gazette), No. 18 (1960) [hereafter Dzien-
nik Ustaw].
15. Dziennik Ustaw, no. 12 (1961).
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involvement of producers in foreign trade operations by permitting
broad associations of producers to establish their own foreign trade
agencies and by authorizing large government enterprises to handle
their own transactions. 16 Normally, in the case of a large company
or a government enterprise, a foreign sales or imports department
becomes an integral part of the enterprise's operation. Sometimes,
smaller firms are encouraged to organize a joint stock company, of
which they become stockholders, to handle their foreign trade trans-
actions and represent their interests exclusively. The direct result
of this approach is the multiplication of foreign trade organizations.
Poland, for instance, has some 100 such agencies, compared to ap-
proximately 50 for the Soviet Union. This approach also tends to ex-
pand the regulatory functions of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, with
an attendant emphasis on aspects of bureaucratic control, as well as
directly involving producers in foreign trade transactions. 17
Czechoslovakia is also experimenting with an approach resem-
bling the Polish model, although on a grander scale. The basic or-
ganization is a separate foreign trade enterprise directly
subordinate to the Foreign Trade Minister. In addition, two new or-
ganizational forms have appeared. First, pre-existing foreign trade
enterprises representing producers of specific assortments of com-
modities and goods were made part of larger economic units, orga-
nized in the form of trusts or concerns (e.g. Skoda), which handle
their products exclusively and are subordinate to competent eco-
nomic ministries or industrial organizations. The second form en-
ables those foreign trade enterprises to create a type of joint stock
company whose shareholders are the organizing producers and
firms. The shareholders elect boards of directors and managers, and
thus control the operation of the trading agency. 18
The new foreign trade system introduced in the German Demo-
cratic Republic typifies the same trend. The East German innova-
tion underscores a tendency present in Eastern Europe toward a
higher degree of regional integration in the industrial sector. Cur-
rently this reform is well advanced. In addition to foreign trade en-
terprises, East Germany has introduced other foreign trade
structures. In accordance with the provisions of the ordinance of 16
April, 1964,19 a number of the larger enterprises may be given the
16. Monitor Polski, no. 69 (1966). See also Vaganov, Organizatisiia i tekhnika
vneshnej torgovli i drugikh sotsialisticheskich stran 24 (1963).
17. Jakubowski, supra n. 8 at 29, 33.
18. Kalensky, "Pravni otazky rizeni zahranicniho obhodu clenskich statu RVHP,"
in Studie z. Mezinarodniho Prava 109 (1966). Knapp, "The Function, Organization
and Activities of Foreign Trade Corporations in the European Socialist Countries," in
The Sources of the Law of International Trade 52 (Schmitthoff ed., 1964).
19. 1968 Recht in der Aussenwirtschaft 10 (Ministry of Foreign Trade of the
GD.R.).
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right of direct participation in foreign trade transactions, a typical
example being the Zeiss Corporation. Still another approach, as in
Poland and Czechoslovakia, subordinates foreign trade enterprises
to branch industrial associations or economic ministries other than
the Ministry of Foreign Trade. A fourth device involves the practice
of licensing specific enterprises to conclude single deals which ei-
ther exclusively affect that particular enterprise or, when combined
with plenary power to handle a transaction, may require the cooper-
ation of other enterprises and a considerable amount of technical
expertise (e.g. plant installation, organization of a system of serv-
ices, etc.) 20
Although the Rumanian system of independent foreign trade
enterprises continues to be maintained, it is being supplemented
and gradually replaced by associations of enterprises organized as
corporate entities and empowered to make contracts with foreign
traders. The aim is to give these associations control of foreign
trade operations, particularly with respect to exports, thus allowing
them to establish direct contacts with foreign clients and explore
the needs of a foreign market. In certain situations, major partici-
pants in associations are accorded the right to contract abroad.
Sometimes a joint foreign trade department has been established to
handle the foreign transactions of member enterprises. Certain as-
sociations also manage imports, particularly of machinery and fac-
tory equipment. 21
In Hungary, foreign trade rights are allocated to large firms,
which for a number of reasons must maintain direct connections
with the foreign markets toward which their production is oriented.
These firms enjoy a virtual monopoly in their line of production, or
collaborate closely with foreign firms, again particularly with enter-
prises dealing in capital goods and factory equipment. Similar privi-
leges are accorded to firms which, in their manufacturing process,
depend upon foreign imports of semi-finished products, parts or raw
materials. In addition, import and export firms have been organized
to represent smaller enterprises in foreign trade transactions. These
firms differ from the foreign trade enterprises of the Soviet type,
which they have gradually begun to replace, in that they buy and
20. Schmandra & Treufeldt, "Die Eigengeschaftigkeit der Exportbetriebe als
Methode zur Steigerung des Okonomischen Nutzeffekts der Aussen-
wirtschaftstatigkeit," in 10 Recht in der Aussenwirtschaft 82, 83-86 (1968). See En-
derlein, Recht im Aussenhandel 22 (1969).
21. Directives of the Central Comm. of the Rumanian Communist Party (1967);
Florescu, 'The Legal Status of Foreign Trade Enterprises-Their Juridical Personal-
ity-in the Socialist Republic of Rumania," in Rechtsfragen der Kooperation zwischen
Unternehmen in Ost und West 48 (1967).
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sell on commission rather than on their own account.22
SOCIALIST MEMBERS OF GATT
There are at present six socialist countries members of GATT:
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania and Hungary
(Bulgaria has been admitted as observer since 1967). Czechoslova-
kia was an original member of the international groups which
drafted GATT, and Cuba was an original signatory, both prior to
their conversion to socialism of the Soviet type. Since their conver-
sion however, their participation in the GATT system is highly lim-
ited because they became subject to restrictions imposed on exports
to Communist countries. 23 Four others, Yugoslavia, Poland,
Romania and Hungary were admitted as a result of negotiations, af-
ter accepting special conditions, which differed in each case.
Accession of Yugoslavia to full GATT membership took several
stages. In 1950 Yugoslavia was granted observer status. 24 On 16
May 1959 Yugoslavia declared that goals and principles of GAT
were accepted as a basis for mutual trade relations with the mem-
bers of GATT, and asked that similar concessions be granted to Yu-
goslavia reciprocally. On 1 July 1960 Yugoslavia introduced a
provisional customs tariff, limited to 127 items.25
In 1961 a permanent tariff schedule covering all items of trade
was adopted, and Yugoslavia applied for regular membership in
GATT; with the tariff Yugoslavia was able to participate in negotia-
tions for lowering or eliminating tariff barriers to trade. On 13 No-
vember 1962 Yugoslavia was provisionally admitted to GATT, and on
5 April 1966 admitted to regular membership. 26
Admission of Poland took a different approach. In the Polish
case it was clear from the beginning that, while Poland adhered to
the general principles of GATT as expressed in the Preamble to the
General Agreement, she would not alter her economic system or her
technique of foreign trade. The basis of admission was to be pro-
vided not by tariff concessions but by a minimal import commitment
from the GATT countries. This suggestion was made as early as
1959.27 Whle this offer was not immediately accepted, the Polish po-
22. Osiatynski & Szilagyi, "Handel zagraniczny w nowym mechanizmie gos-
podarczym WRL," Handel Zagraniczny no. 3 (1968).
23. Reuland, "GAIT and State-Trading Countries," 9 J. World Trade Law 318
(1975); Grzybowki, "East-West Trade Regulations in the United States, The 1974
Trade Act, Title IV," 11 J. World Trade Law 506-07 (1977).
24. GAIT/INT/67/240 2 Nov. 1967.
25. Declaration of Association, 16 May 1959, GATT L/986.
26. Accession of Yugoslavia: Report of the Working Party, Basic Instruments and
Selected Documents (BISD) 14th Supp. and Protocol of Accession BISD 15th Supp.
(1967).
27. GAIT Doc. L/1785, L/227 and L/2595.
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sition was strengthened when in 1960 the United States granted Po-
land most-favored-nation treatment, and the Commerce and
Consular Rights Treaty (1931) with the United States was con-
firmed.28
An opportunity for a formal application for admission was of-
fered by the so-called Kennedy Round of negotiations for further
trade concessions. In the course of negotiations definite Polish per-
centage increases in imports from GATT countries were coupled
with periodic review of her trade relations within GATT. 29 The Pro-
tocol of Accession worked out in the negotiations with Poland set
the annual increase of imports from GATT members at 7%.30 With
this general formula GATT was satisfied. The Protocol of Accession
did not rule out variations between increases in trade with individ-
ual members of GATT. What was required is that global imports
from GATT countries should increase. Whether Poland with her
price policies and investment programs can really adhere, not only
in letter but also in spirit, to provisions of art. xvii of GATT, is an-
other matter. Art xvn establishes the rule that state trading enter-
prises shall make transactions "solely in accordance with
commercial considerations, including price, quality, availability,
marketability, transportation. . . ," thus theoretically excluding
other motivations, which seems to contradict the basic tenets of eco-
nomic planning in a socialist country of the Soviet type.
The annual review obligation seems to indicate that trade in-
creases must be fairly distributed between the member countries.
The reviews deal primarily with the direction and composition of
Polish foreign trade. Three months before a review the parties may
request consultations regarding specific trade problems, including
mutual concessions. Parties not satisfied with mutual performance
may withdraw concessions under GATT and the Protocol of Acces-
sion.31
Romania's accession to GATT also was based on the planned in-
crease formula. However it was calculated somewhat differently.
The Agreement of Accession signed in 1967 stated that Romania in-
tends "... to increase its imports from the contracting parties as a
whole at a rate not smaller than the growth of total Romanian im-
ports provided for in its Five Year Plan. '32 In exchange, members of
GATT agreed to remove quantitative restrictions and grant Romania
MFN treatment. Negotiations and consultations on the progress of
trade are held every two years.
28. 60 USTS 1609, TIAS no. 1915, cf. East-West Trade, supra n. 1 at 138.
29. GArfT TN 64/NTB/15 of 27 April 1964.
30. GATT Doc. L/2851 July 1967.
31. Protocol for the Accession of Poland, 30 June 1967, 609 UNTS 236.
32. GAIT Doc. L/3557, Accession of Romania 5 August 1971, 807 UNTS 312.
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Hungary's accession to GATT was based on conditions resem-
bling those under which Yugoslavia was admitted. Hungary was ac-
cepted under the procedures provided for in art. xxxiii of GATT, on
terms agreed in separate negotiations. Hungarian application for
admission to GATT relied upon a conscious reorganization of the
central management of its economic life, which allegedly introduced
market relations. Hungary, it was said, adopted the New Economic
Mechanism. In addition Hungary adopted a tariff schedule, with two
columns: one covering countries with whom Hungary traded on the
MFN principle, and the other for non-MFN trade, repeating the Yu-
goslav reorganization of its foreign trade relations.
33
Hungary claimed that its foreign trade enterprises were able to
buy and sell in world markets competitively, that it had no non-tariff
barriers to trade, and was ready to grant binding tariff concessions
and MFN treatment to its GATT partners in exchange for reciprocal
MFN treatment. She further claimed that although the Hungarian
government remains the owner of* the means of production and the
overall economic plan fixes import and export targets for the Hun-
garian economy, foreign trade agencies and various manufacturing
enterprises are free to make contracts in foreign markets, exclu-
sively on the basis of commercial considerations. 34
It took four years for a working party, established for that pur-
pose, to work out conditions of Hungarian accession to GATT. One
of the important conditions accepted by the working party was the
exemption of relations with other socialist countries (members of
the CMEA) from the GATT provision on the MFN clause and non-
discrimination.3
The Protocols of Accession to GATT for Poland, Romania and
Hungary have several common elements. In each the Contracting
Parties agreed to reduce gradually all discriminatory quantitative
restrictions on imports from the acceding state. The Contracting
Parties reserved the right to take discriminatory safeguard action
against the acceding state's exports, if those exports cause serious
injury to domestic producers (a reservation departing from the pro-
visions of art. xix of GAIT which provides for nondiscriminatory
emergency action directed against the product, not the country of
origin). Accessions provided also for mutual withdrawal of
equivalent concessions in the event of a dispute concerning the ful-
ifilment of commitments under the accessions.
33. Reuland, supra n. 23 at 329.
34. GATT Doc. W/24/B, 14 Nov. 1967.
35. Id.
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STATE TRADING AND GATT
Art. xvu of GATT permits state trading, providing that state en-
terprises ". . . act in a manner consistent with the general principles
of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed . . . for governmental
measures affecting imports and exports by private traders." In other
words, government trading enterprises should conduct their opera-
tion exclusively on commercial principles. GATT is aimed at devel-
oping world trade by private traders primarily, and socialist
countries admitted to GATT are bound to a policy of non-discrimina-
tion against private traders.
Concessions to the socialist members represent important de-
partures from the GATT regime. In the first place there is the ques-
tion of non-discrimination. It applies in trade relations between
GATT members, whether socialist or free economy. However it
does not necessarily apply in socialist countries to all their trade,
because their trade with other socialist countries who are members
of CMEA but not members of GArT rests on different principles.
With price manipulation, annual trade balances, commitments to
import a planned volume of commodities and services, concessions
to socialist trade may not meet the conditions of trade with free
economy partners. In the Polish and Romanian accession condi-
tions, GATTr members were at least assured a share of the markets.
The Romanian formula seems a better answer to the modified non-
discrimination formula because it guarantees expansion of the
,Romanian market share at least as large as that of CMEA trade. In
,the Polish case, the obligation to increase GATT' trade has been
more than met, as Polish imports from the free world have greatly
surpassed the minimum 7%.36
A dubious feature of the Hungarian accession is the forint ex-
change rate, which is different for West and East trade. For foreign
transactions Hungarians use the covertible ruble at 40 forints/ruble,
and the U.S. dollar at 60 forints/dollar for GATT trade. Thus, offi-
cially, a ruble is rated higher than a dollar. Hungarian rates of ex-
change may indicate that the ruble is overvalued as compared to the
dollar, or it may suggest price manipulation which would make so-
cialist commodities cheaper in Hungary than GATT imported com-
modities. Since the ruble is not traded in world exchanges it is
impossible to test its real value against freely convertible curren-
cies. Differential rates of exchange may also suggest that Hungary
is subsidizing her Comecon exports, while there are no subsidies for
exports to the GATT markets.37
36. Reuland, supra n. 23 at 327.
37. Kostecki, "Hungary and GATT," 8 J. World Trade Law 411 (1974). GATT Doc.
L/3301 1. 11; Reuland, supra n. 23 at 33.
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In contrast with the Hungarian practices, Yugoslavia on acceed-
ing to GATT devalued her currency from 759 dinars/dollar to 1250 di-
nars, in order to avoid subsidizing her exports to both the GATT and
CMEA markets.38
While it is obvious that double exchange rates are in direct con-
flict with the principles of GATT, it is also true that the Hungarian
practice is only an example of the pecularities of East-West trade in
general. In the socialist economy, formation of prices is not con-
trolled by the market but by the requirements of the plan. This ap-
plies as well to trade relations between socialist countries as in
trade between socialist and market economy countries. Typical in
this respect is the experience of Yugoslavia, which trades with the
West (EEC in particular) on GATT terms and maintains trade rela-
tions with the CMEA countries on CMEA terms, including long term
and annual trade agreements, no different from any other member
of the Council.39 In the final analysis therefore, double standards of
trade techniques and practices-including currency manipulations-
are a permanent feature of socialist trade, in whichever direction it
goes.
Indeed, in comparative analysis of foreign trade regimes of the
non-market and market economy countries, the central difference
between them is the degree of government control over trade trans-
actions. In socialist economies government preferences prevail over
consumer choice. In market economies, tariffs express a compro-
mise between one and the other type of preference. Tariffs in social-
ist economies have little influence on the volume of imports. Tariffs
are a non-essential part of the import control system. More efficient
methods to regulate the flow of imports are licensing and foreign
currency controls. They are practiced in Hungary as well as in other
socialist countries. Indeed they are an indispensable instrument in
realizing the goals and targets of the economic plan. However unre-
strained and competitive Hungarian trade agencies may be in the
selection of their trading partners and of the assortment of imported
goods, they still need to obtain import licenses and foreign currency
allocations. It is clear that these controls are adequate to place the
final decision on the conduct and policy of foreign trade in the min-
istry of foreign trade.
PERSPECTIVES
The accession of socialist countries to GATT is a realistic step,
38. Cf. Woznowski, "The Socialist Countries Membership in the GATT," I Polish
Yearbook of International Law 210-11 (1970). BISD Supp. XV.
39. Cf. Jovanovic, "Yugoslav Trade With EEC and Comecon "Countries," 1972
East-West Trade 196-201.
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which may eventually bring about their integration into a world
trade system. At this moment the volume of trade which follows the
channels established by socialist presence in GATT is so insignifi-
cant that practically, departures from its system are not important.
A Polish analyst claimed that as a result of internal difficulties in
GATT the Kennedy round of tariff negotiations was initiated, and
that participation of socialist countries resolved an internal crisis
which prevented further progress of GATT. Nothing is further from
the truth. Only Hungary was admitted under art. xxxiii in the
course of the Kennedy round. Furthermore, GATT difficulties, and
indeed they were serious, lay in non-tariff barriers existing in the
trade among the industrialized countries of the West (Japan in-
cluded). Socialist markets could offer little to the solution of trade
difficulties in that area. Socialist economists may be reassured that
they have not contributed to the revitalization of the capitalist trad-
ing system, which is able to accommodate economic cooperation be-
tween countries with different social structures and varying degrees
of economic development. 4°
The importance of the accession of four socialist countries to
GATT must be seen in different lights. Certainly it is not important
in volume of trade or other aspects of economic cooperation. Its pri-
mary meaning is the reaffirmation that these four countries, tradi-
tionally a part of Western spiritual and economic reality, are finding
their way into the old pattern of coexistence. At the same time it is
clear that only a first step has been made. Each case of accession
was an independent experiment and only the future will show
which method will prove best at liberalizing trade between free
economy and socialist countries. Perhaps, in time, it will be possible
to reestablish a single trade system, a development of singular im-
portance for the political stability of the world.
It must also be realized that socialist acceptance of the GATT
system is limited by the ability to afford economic cooperation with
free economy countries. Their basic aim is to develop their econo-
mies, stressing the industrial and high technology production which
limits the capacity of their markets. As a Soviet author wrote:
To an increasing degree the Socialist countries acquire in
the West machinery, factory equipment, patents and tech-
nological processes for those sectors of modern industry in
which western states, for a number of reasons, have
achieved a high level of technological development: chemi-
cal and petrochemical industries, special branches of
machine construction, computer technology, transportation
industry, cellulose-paper industry, food and light indus-
40. Woznowski, supra n. 38 at 199 ff.
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tries .... Economic cooperation with the West also permits
solution of the raw materials and supply problems of the so-
cialist countries. A rising standard of living in the socialist
countries resulted in recent years in increased imports of
mass consumption commodities; however, imports of that
category of commodities to the socialist countries are still
comparatively low.41
It is a political question whether this policy is to be encouraged.
It may be pointed out however that the framework of GATT allows
various levels of participation in the program of free trade. Art. xvui
and xxxvi-xxxvm of the General Agreement make exceptions for
countries whose economic development would be hampered by full
liberalization of their foreign trade, and who must follow a protec-
tionist policy in order to develop their industries.
Indeed, GATT seems to provide a framework for trade coopera-
tion of at least three groups of countries: highly industrialized econ-
omies, which can meet the challenge of free trade and the
international division of labor with no hazard to their living stan-
dard; the developing nations, which need assistance, and are unable
to reciprocate fully the advantages of admission to GATT on terms
of equality; finally, state trading nations that are not able, owing to
their social and economic order, to be fully integrated into the world
trade mechanism. 42
The presence of the latter groups in GAT calls for concessions
and adjustments justifiable not in terms of pure trade policies but in
terms of political expectations. Can they be less than fully inte-
grated into a world of peace and.security is the basic question. Ob-
viously, before these expectations are realized the participation of
the socialist countries must become much, much broader.
Economic development and world prosperity are the best guar-
antee of peace; trade, one of the most important factors in raising
the standard of living, responds to a political climate which pro-
motes the sense of security.
A Soviet economist, writing on the future of trade relations be-
tween CMEA countries and the European Common Market, under-
scored the need for trust and cooperation:
Progress in the area of economic cooperation between
socialist countries of Europe without doubt depends upon
whether leaders of the EEC are willing to adapt this organi-
zation to the needs of new Europe---the Europe of trust and
41. Shmelev, supra n. 6 at 35.
42. Grzybowski, "Towards Integrated Management of International Trade-the
U.S. Trade Act 1974," 1977 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 292-293.
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cooperation. 43
Obviously the implication of these remarks is that the leaders of
the West are still distrustful of the Soviet Bloc. One may wish that
the writer's remarks were not so one-sided, since it is obvious that
Soviet policies leave a good deal to be desired as to promotion of
peace and stability. Soviet Bloc political leadership must recognize
that trust is a condition related primarily to the conduct of govern-
ments in international relations. Obviously it will not result from
the use of force and military adventurism exemplified by the pres-
ence of Cuban mercenaries in Africa, military interventions in East-
em Europe (Czechoslovakia and Hungary), and Asia (Afghanistan).
43. Shmelev, supra n. 6 at 51.
